by Dr George N. Tzogopoulos
7 July 2023. Much emphasis is currently placed on Sino-Russian relations. The partnership of the two countries is multifaceted and has the potential to impact on the world order. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine perplexes matters as it is testing the limits of this partnership. While the interests of Beijing and Moscow intersect in opposing American foreign policy objectives, they are not always identical. As long as the war in Ukraine continues, dilemmas are emerging and scenarios are being debated about the future direction of the international system, Russia’s position in it, and China’s responses.
The status of relations between China and Russia in the new world order captures the attention of politicians, diplomats, journalists and scholars. The Sino-Russian partnership in the context of the 2022 invasion of Ukraine is naturally coming to the epicenter. Even before the beginning of the war, the two countries had started to steadily and carefully forge their own nexus of collaboration. After Russia annexed Crimea in 2014, the Chinese government applied a policy it typically applies in similar cases in the international scene. It abstained at the UN level. In particular, it did so when the UN Security Council attempted to adopt a draft resolution urging countries not to recognize the result of the referendum. The official explanation was that it was seeking a balanced solution to the conflict due to ‘complex historical and practical factors.’ In substance, in a period during which relations between China and the West were generally stable, the former refrained from openly supporting Russia but diagnosed double standards in the Western interpretation of international conflicts and decided thus to draw a line for the years to come.
In the aftermath of the failure of the UN to adopt the draft resolution on the Crimea referendum – as Russia voted against – President Vladimir Putin met his Chinese counterpart Xi Jinping in Shanghai. In May 2014, they expressed commitment to bring ‘their comprehensive bilateral strategic partnership of coordination to higher level.’ Since 2014, Sino-Russian relations have flourished at all levels indeed. Among other things, it was in 2014 when the two sides signed a $400 billion natural gas deal to deliver Russian gas to China (38 BCM annually for 30 years) via a new pipeline, the Power of Siberia. The Power of Siberia became operational in the end of 2019, although some of its routes are still under construction. Russia managed thus to enhance its energy diversification policy toward Asia by relying not only on LNG exports but also on gas infrastructure. Ironically, it would heavily rely on this policy in the future, especially after 24 February 2022.
Trade between China and Russia rose from circa 95 billion in 2014 to circa $190 billion in 2022. What also matters in that regard is the determination of the two countries to use their own currencies in exchanges. This happened for the first time in 2010, when the yuan-ruble trade started. In 2014, the People’s Bank of China and the Central Bank of China signed a bilateral local currency swap arrangement for almost $24.5 billion. Five years later, in 2019 the two sides agreed to increase the use of their respective national currencies in cross-border trade to 50 percent. While China aims at making gradual steps to internationalize the yuan, it is obvious that both countries have teamed up to reduce their reliance on the US dollar either themselves or multilaterally through their participations in groups such as BRICS along with Brazil, India and South Africa. The bilateral partnership seems rather unequal though. An Atlantic Council study demonstrates that only 23 percent of Russian exports to China were settled in the dollar in 2020, whereas 60 percent of Chinese exports to Russia were still denominated in the dollar.
Synergies have expanded in the sphere of defense and security. Both countries are members in the Security Cooperation Organization (SCO) and they frequently conduct joint military exercises. In 2012, the two held their first binational naval maneuver in the Yellow Sea near Qingdao. In the next years, they even organized maneuvers in the Mediterranean and the Baltic Sea, in 2015 and 2017 respectively – and so many other examples of relative military training can be given. Furthermore, arms deals have been on the agenda. Following the annexation of Crimea, President Putin approved the sale of the S-400 air defense system to China in April 2014. While information about all military deals is not disclosed, there are occasions when announcements are made. In 2019, the Russian President said that Moscow was helping develop a Chinese missile early-warning system, and in 2021, he admitted that the two sides were jointly developing high-tech weapons.
The deterioration of Sino-American relations in the years of Donald Trump and under the Joe Biden presidency have brought China and Russia closer. The Chinese and the Russian governments have built a type of common understanding in opposing American strategic objectives, among other things the support of democracy and the promotion of human rights abroad. Against this backdrop, the two signed a joint statement on 4 February 2022, only weeks before the beginning of the invasion of Ukraine by the Russian army. This statement covers different sectors of Sino-Russian collaboration from energy and the economy to artificial intelligence, space and arms control. More importantly, it outlines the ambition of Beijing and Moscow to shape world governance their own way as, the statement reads, ‘some actors representing but the minority on the international scale continue to advocate unilateral approaches to addressing international issues and resort to force [and] interfere in the internal affairs of other states.’
Following the outbreak of the Ukraine conflict China has been one of the most important world countries – if not the most important – not joining Western sanctions against Russia. The pre-existing system of bilateral Sino-Russian coordination has been cemented allowing Moscow to somewhat circumvent economic measures targeting its economy. A Columbia University study, for example, exhibits that China spent $81.3 billion on imports of Russian oil, coal, LNG, and pipeline gas in 2022, up from $52.1 billion in 2021. Further to this, China is proving an economic lifeline to Russia by supplying it with large volumes of products including raw materials, smartphones, vehicles and computer chips. These products can be possibly used by both civilians and armed forces. At the writing, there is much debate about the alleged intention of Beijing to offer military assistance to Moscow, an action that will cross the red line of the USA and the EU. The Chinese government refutes relevant information. Continuous high-level Sino-Russian contacts raise some doubts, however. President Xi went to Moscow in March 2023, a visit that reflected his sympathy vis-à-vis his Russian counterpart and the Russian position on the conflict.
The Chinese government approaches the Ukraine war from the prism of its own interests. Although it considers the Taiwan Question its internal affair, it certainly sees similarities between this case and the one of Ukraine. In so doing, it seeks to fortify its own interpretation of security that explains conflicts in the international system – dubbed as Global Security Initiative. China does not necessarily expect from Russia to directly support it in the Taiwan Strait but links the Russian invasion of Ukraine to its own goals. That is perhaps why the recent Chinese peace plan includes no details about how the territorial integrity of Ukraine might be practically restored under the current conditions of the continuing invasion. In a complex international environment, Beijing and Moscow have not formed a military alliance. They have been united to some degree in responding to what they perceive as a common threat – the role of the USA – in a spirit of solidarity.
The Sino-Russian relationship is often described as asymmetrical due to the different size of the two economies and their global impact. According to President of France Emmanuel Macron Russia ‘has entered a form of subservience with regards to China’ due to the conflict in Ukraine. Theoretically, Russia needs China more than vice-versa. In spite of the asymmetry, the bilateral partnership is not one-sided. Russia has a clear advantage in natural resources and nuclear capacity that allows it to have some leverage in conversations with China. And the two countries do not always agree in spite of common diplomatic language regularly used. In an interview with The Economist Henry Kissinger doubted the two could work harmoniously together.
Recently, for instance, Moscow might not have been particularly satisfied to see China organize a summit with Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan in Xian, and benefit by the weaking of its own influence (the Russian influence) in Central Asia.
In the final account, Russia’s role will be critical for the future direction of the international system as long as Sino-American antagonism persists. While some scholars believe that China ‘is winning from the carnage’ because the USA is bogged down in another protracted and unwinnable war, there is also a counter-argument. China will arguably shape the outcome of the conflict in a manner that will place Russia under its own sphere of influence in the medium and long-term without generating a new type of hostility with the West it strives to prevent. Already, the reenergization of NATO and the revitalization of ties between the USA and its allies – such as the EU, Japan and South Korea – are developments the Chinese government had not wished to monitor as an immediate result of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. Last but not least, a potential usage of tactical nuclear weapons by Moscow in the Ukraine battlefield will push the Chinese government to clarify its position about the conflict and beyond. During a war, all scenarios – even extreme ones – are taken into consideration.
Dr George N. Tzogopoulos is an expert in media, international relations and Chinese affairs. He is lecturer at the European Institute of Nice – CIFE – and Fellow at the Begin Sadat Center for Strategic Studies, and at the Hellenic Foundation for European and Foreign Policy. He regularly participates in the M100 Sanssouci Colloquium.
