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With Russia as a Systemic Threat, Europe Needs a New Recipe for Peace and Prosperity
Ladies and Gentlemen,
Esteemed colleagues and distinguished guests,
First of all I want to thank the organizers M100 Sanssouci Colloquium for the invitation to speak here today. Our collective expertise, drawn from media, academia, and politics across Europe, is more critical than ever, as we confront the complex challenges threatening our democracies. I very much look forward to the discussions here today.
Let me be honest: the main reason why I accepted the invitation to be the opening speaker – except the great honor of course – was the opportunity to address some concerns that I have with the urgency and magnitude of the Russian threat, what it means for Europe and what we should do about it.
You might ask ( – or even sigh): what is new about the Russian threat? Already in 2022, NATO in its Strategic Concept defined Russia as the “most significant and direct threat” to Allies’ security and to peace and stability in the Euro-Atlantic area.
Similarly, the European Union stated in its Strategic Compass from the same year, that Russia’s “aggressive and revisionist actions (…) severely and directly threaten the European security order and the security of European citizens.”
In media, we frequently learn about Russia´s brutal military attacks, its killings of civilians and repeated war crimes in Ukraine.
You might also think – well what about China? Or Iran? Or terrorists? There are other threats to Europe that might be as severe. Nevertheless, I want to focus this speech on Russia. Call it geopolitics, if you wish. Because no matter how hard Europe tries, it can never escape the fact that it neighbours Russia, and has to relate to Russia, one way or the other.
I am concerned about a couple of beliefs that are quite widespread, but do not capture the essence of the Russia challenge correctly. Therefore, if applied, these beliefs will not lead us to the right solutions. They will not bring peace; they will not bring prosperity. On the contrary, they can be devastating for European security.
The first is the belief that Russia’s war on Ukraine is a local matter, and when solved, things can go back to normal. The second is the belief that inaction and a wait-and-see-how-it develops-mentality causes no harm to peace and prosperity.
I will start by addressing these beliefs and their fallacies. I will offer alternative pathways of thinking and propose recommendations for how Europe should deal with Russia.
My first concern is the rather widespread belief that Russia’s war on Ukraine is a local problem, that, once settled in truce or peace agreement, will make it possible for Europe to go back to how things were in the period after the fall of the Berlin wall.
However, this will not be possible, because Russia is not a local problem. Rather, Russia is nowadays a threat to the international system, what we, International Relations scholars call “a systemic threat”. Here I build on work by political scientist Dan Reiter (1996). He differs between direct, military threats and “systemic threats”.
A systemic threat is a state that poses a general threat to others, and it has the potential to shift and affect the international system. As a systemic threat, Russia has broad ambitions for greater political power and territory. Such a systemic threat concerns all states in Europe, even if they have no direct disputes with Russia, because they all risk being “drawn into a future, systemwide war”.
Already in 2014, with the illegal annexation of Crimea and war in Donbas, I argue that the West got Russia wrong. The US had already pivoted to Asia and President Obama called Russia a “regional power” marked by “weakness”. He was more concerned about “the prosect of a nuclear weapon going off in Manhattan” than Russia, and let the regional European actors, France and Germany, take the lead in solving the conflict through the Normandie format, while continuing to decrease American defence spending. Eight years later, Russia escalated its aggression with a full-scale invasion of Ukraine
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What evidence do I have to claim that Russia is a systemic threat, and not merely a direct military threat to Ukraine? Here, we can look at three aspects:
Russia’s intentions, its capabilities and behaviour.
On intentions, Russia’s preference of a multipolar international system has been clear since Putin’s speech at the Munich Security Conference in 2007.
Russia should constitute one such “pole” in the multipolar system. A pole is a great power with the aggregated military and economic resources to achieve its ends on the global arena.
However, since Russia´s economic power does not suffice for a position as a pole – Russia´s GDP is less than that of Italy or Canada – Russia instead uses its military power and the modernization and build-up of its military capabilities, combined with hybrid warfare and nuclear rattling, to compensate for its economic weakness. Russia also aligns with China to strengthen its position in the international system.
Russia´s ambitions are illustrated not only by its war on Georgia in 2008, or use of military aggression on Ukraine since 2014; or its repeated threats of using nuclear weapons. Just the other week, Russia announced a revision of its doctrine on the use of nuclear weapons.
Russia also continues to wage a hybrid war against Europe, escalating daily through sabotage, instrumentalization of migration, disinformation campaigns, cyberattacks, attacks on critical infrastructure, and economic coercion.
The impact of this warfare is increasingly evident. However, Russia’s aggressive behaviour reaches far beyond Europe. Once again, the US revealed a Russian campaign to interfere in the up-coming American elections, as it did in 2018. The dossier shows how the Kremlin also targeted German, French, Italian and British actors in the media, politics and business, according to Politico.
Another example is Russia’s actions in Mali in 2022, where through the Wagner group, Russia effectively replaced the French security operations and seized control of valuable resources like gold mines. This strategy is about weakening the EU and France’s standing in Africa, and expanding Russia’s geopolitical footprint.
Or the Middle East, where Russian officers have been deployed to advise the Iran-backed Houthi forces in Yemen on targeting commercial vessels in the Red Sea and possibly supplying them with advanced anti-ship missiles. This is part of a broader effort to challenge US and allied interests in the region.
North Korea has become a key player in Russia’s war strategy. The recent mutual defence pact between Moscow and Pyongyang has seen over 11,000 containers of munitions shipped from North Korea to Russia since September 2023, bolstering its war effort in Ukraine.
Moreover, Russia’s relationship with China grows stronger, as both nations seek to reshape the international order to their advantage. NATO has recently called China a “decisive enabler” of Russia’s war in Ukraine, with China providing critical technology and components to bolster Russia’s defence capabilities. The Russia-China cooperation extends to military operations. We just witnessed their recent first joint strategic patrol in international airspace ff Alaska.
Ladies and Gentlemen, these are just a few examples showing Russia’s systemic ambitions and outreach. Russia does not compare itself with regional actors such as France or Germany, but with the United States and China, the other potential poles of an emerging multipolar system.
Put differently, even if Russia’s war on Ukraine would end, that will not be the end of Russia´s ambitions, nor its role as a spoiler to international peace and order, because that is the role Russia must take in order to punch above its economic weight.
Therefore, Europe must adopt to Russia as a systemic threat, with a long-term strategy beyond the immediate situation. Europe needs to realize that yes, Russia will geographically always be at the border of Europe, but no, it is not inevitably a part of Europe or necessarily included in our security order. Europe should instead balance against Russia.
This shift profoundly affects how Europe can build peace and prosperity in the future. We need a new recipe, and I will come back to what concrete steps that Europe needs to take.
Before that, I want to address my second concern, which is the risk of inaction. This is a belief that a wait-and-see-how-it-goes approach to Russia could be beneficial for a peaceful path ahead.
Such a belief builds on considerations such as: is there really any danger to hope for the best, to signal a wish for dialogue and détente regardless of Russia’s behaviour? Is that not merely responsible leadership, an attempt to avoid escalation of conflict, to open up for communication and mutual understanding and tune down military aspects?
Unfortunately not. In fact, inaction and hesitation might accelerate aggressive behaviour. Also in this aspect, the answer to the question lies in the recognition of Russia as a systemic threat. Misperception or misjudgement can have grand effects, as the Munich agreement in 1938 taught us.
Remember, a systemic threat is a great power with broad ambitions for greater political power and territory. As Robert Jervis (1982) points out in his groundbreaking work on “security regimes”, such a power is not interested in self-imposed restraints on its behaviour, because it wants to shift the status quo to its favour, and it wants to have room for expansion.
Instead, a threatening great power must be balanced by other great powers to restore peace and order. Deterrence is key in this regard.
Balancing is done externally by states by forging alliances to counter the power projection of the threatening state. Having Sweden and Finland join NATO is a good illustration of external balancing behaviour. It contributes to the security of the entire alliance.
Balancing is also done by internal actions by states such as investing in military capabilities targeted to meet the particular threat. Despite efforts to increase defence spending, where 23 of 32 allies this year have reached 2 % of GDP, it is clear that Europe has not yet done enough to counter Russia. Russia is not deterred by Europe. Its decade-long hybrid warfare against us clearly illustrates that.
Just this year, high-up politicians like an aide in the Bundestag and a Latvian MEP were proven to be Russian agents. German investigators uncovered the widespread use of bots making hundreds of thousands of posts per day on social media, aiming to manipulate public opinion. French investigations similarly revealed a sprawling network of Russian disinformation sites targeting Germany, Poland, and France.
Moreover, cyberattacks linked to Russian hacking groups have struck at the heart of our digital infrastructure, including Microsoft, further demonstrating the scale of the threat we face.
When Poland’s President Donald Tusk at Easter warned that Europe is in a prewar era, he was not the first. British Army Chief Sanders did the same in January, and Germany’s Defence Minister Pistorius assessed that Russia could start a major war with Europe within five to eight years.
Ladies and gentlemen, there is no time to wait and see.
So, what must Europe do? The answer is clear: Europe needs a new approach, a realistic recipe for deterrence, resilience and defence.
Alongside the often-discussed ingredients of sustainability, competitive edge, green initiatives and the use of new technology, Europe must invest in defence and resilience – solid, long-term investments that match the scale of the (Russia) challenge before us.
Along these lines, let me pose the following recommendations:
• First, Europe must recognize that peace and prosperity must be built on a solid foundation of defence capability. Put differently, having deterrence, resilience and defence in place is a prerequisite for prosperity. It is not an optional path that can be dismissed due to other urgent needs in the state budget. In short, Europe will not be able to maintain prosperity without a strong defence.
• Europe´s first line of defence is presently in Ukraine. Hence, EU member states and NATO allies should commit to spend 0.25% of their GDP annually to military support for Ukraine, who is fighting our fight. Such a pledge signals to Russia that we are not giving up on support. Nations like Estonia, Latvia and Sweden have already set a precedent and other should follow suit.
• Furthermore, EU member states and NATO allies must ramp up their defence spending to 3% of GDP. Allies have already agreed that 2% should be the floor, not the ceiling. At the next NATO Summit, allies should make a pledge to reach 3 % by 2030 the latest. EU leaders should do a parallel pledge at the same level of ambition.
• In additon, Europe must step up its contribution to NATO. European and Canadian allies should provide at least 50% of NATO’s designated capabilities by 2030. This would not only enhance Europe’s defensive capabilities but also shift the leadership dynamics within NATO, signalling Europe’s readiness to shoulder its share of the burden and emphasising its growing role in this new reality.
• I have talked in length on Russia’s hybrid warfare. It is important that hybrid threats are not seen in isolation from, or in opposition to, military threats. Hybrid and military threats are means in the same toolbox and can be combined and designed to reinforce each other.
• Accordingly, we must develop a holistic and comprehensive security culture to counter hybrid warfare successfully. This demands a well-coordinated combination of civilian and military planning.
• One step was taken by NATO at the Washington Summit, when allies recognized the necessity of integrating civilian planning into the defence strategies.
• Other areas where we must think much more integrated are interoperability and mobility, which are crucial for the defence of Europe.
The need for forward-deployed logistics, secure support chains, and enhanced movement of armed forces across Europe has become increasingly visible in light of recent incidents like the arson attacks on French and German railway systems.
• The EU can take further steps to become a true deterrent on hybrid warfare. Presently, our response is too weak and fragmented.
• As a new report from EUISS points at “there is a rising interplay between disinformation campaigns, cyberattacks and economic espionage, political subversion and the (mis)use of increasingly more sophisticated AI technologies by hostile actors.” (2024, p 53)
• What are the patterns between these incidents, their effects and broader implications? To deter and counter hybrid warfare, we need not only to see how various societal domains are used and interconnected. We also need to develop tactics to respond across domains. The EU can support through joint threat assessments, intel sharing, regulatory measures and policy harmonising for instance.
• Increased investment in public awareness and resilience is also crucial. Public exposure of foreign interference incidents raises the costs of interference. Mainstream media plays an important role here.
• Finally, we must not lose sight of other regions, including Moldova, Georgia and the Western Balkans, that are highly vulnerable to Russian influence and at critical political junctures.
As we face a complex threat landscape, with Russia’s aggressive manoeuvres and growing influence, the need for more, decisive action and unity across Europe and NATO has never been more critical. We must acknowledge Russia as a systemic threat that demands a robust response and a new recipe for peace and prosperity, in which defence is a foundation, not an optional policy area among many.
Let us act with the resolve and unity needed to face the challenges ahead, with a clear-eyed understanding of the stakes and a firm commitment to defend our shared future.
Thank you.
